Duquesne Law Review
Volume 4

Number 3

Article 8

1965

Criminal Law - Habeas Corpus - Prematurity
John L. Gedid

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John L. Gedid, Criminal Law - Habeas Corpus - Prematurity, 4 Duq. L. Rev. 468 (1965).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol4/iss3/8

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:468

CRIMINAL LAw-Habeas Corpus-Prematurity-Pennsylvania has abro-

gated the prematurity doctrine.*
Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 501
(1965).
Appellant Stevens was found guilty of felony murder in a jury trial in
1954 and sentenced to life imprisonment. At the time of the trial, Stevens
was already serving a ten to twenty year unrelated sentence for robbery
which began to run earlier in 1954. No direct appeal was taken from the
murder conviction; however, in 1959 and again in 1963 the murder conviction was attacked by means of a petition for habeas corpus. Both
petitions were denied.' The instant case is an appeal from the dismissal
of the second petition.
Although prior to this case habeas corpus could be used only as a
means of postconviction collateral attack against a sentence which the
relator was presently serving, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
the prematurity doctrine would no longer bar a habeas corpus attack on
a sentence which the relator had not yet begun to serve. On the merits
the court held that the refusal of trial counsel to take a direct appeal
because of Steven's indigency might constitute a denial of his right to
counsel because of the retroactive application of Douglas v. California.2
The order of the lower court was vacated and the case remanded for rehearing. Under the old rule governing issuance of the writ, 1974 would
have been the earliest date at which Stevens could have attacked the
1954 murder conviction.'
In deciding that the prematurity of a habeas corpus petition would no
longer be grounds for its denial, the court based its rationale on three
factors.4 First, the writ of habeas corpus has developed historically into
the expanded function of postconviction collateral attack, and is the
"chief and only comprehensive method of collateral attack in Pennsylvania."' Second, the recent changes wrought in the area of constitutional

* Editor's note: At the time this issue went to press, the Pennsylvania legislature
enacted the Post Conviction Hearing Act, which was approved on January 25, 1966 (Pennsylvania Laws 1965, act 554). This act establishes a single post-conviction procedure for
dealing with allegations of denial of due process. The act, however, does not expressly provide
for the prematurity problem. It seems, therefore, that the law of the instant case is still valid
and will be incorporated into the act by the judiciary.
1. Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 398 Pa. 23, 156 A.2d 527 (1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 816 (1960).
2. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
3. Commonwealth ex rel. Salerno v. Banmiller, 189 Pa. Super. 156, 149 A.2d 501 (1959).
4. The court expressly notes that the prematurity doctrine has never been fully considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419
Pa. 1, 5 n.6, 213 A.2d 613, 616 n.6 (1965).
5. Id. at 11 n.15.
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law by the United States Supreme Court demand an expanded function
for the writ in the state courts.' Third, prejudice results to the prosecution
and defense, because of the length of time which intervenes between the
trial of the crime which is being collaterally attacked and retrial when
an intervening sentence must be served. This delay is often so protracted
that all witnesses are dead.7
The history of habeas corpus in Pennsylvania has been a long and
steadily developing one which had its genesis in the English common laws
and which is guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution.' Generally, the
writ in this jurisdiction will issue only if the sentencing court is without
jurisdiction, if the record shows no crime has been committed, if an illegal
sentence has been passed, if the relator has been detained after his
sentence has expired, or if the relator has been denied due process.10
Furthermore, the writ will lie only to test actual and present restraint, and
cannot be used where the prisoner is in custody as a result of a final
decree: the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction carries with it a
presumption of regularity and this presumption is not open to collateral
attack by means of habeas corpus." In spite of these restrictions, habeas
corpus has become the most frequently used postconviction remedy. 2
Recently, certain modifications and relaxations of the strict rules governing the issuance of habeas corpus began to occur. These changes laid
the basis for the change in the instant case. A good example of the system
6. E.g., Douglas v. California, supra note 2; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7. The court mentions several recent cases in which habeas corpus was granted. In
O'Lock v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 515, 204 A.2d 439 (1964) the time was 20 years between trial
and retrial. In Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 416 Pa. 321, 206 A.2d 283 (1965)
the time'was 25 years, Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, supra note 4, at 14 n.18.
8. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIFS *135. The English statute is the Habeas Corpus Act,
16 Car. 1 C. 10, Star Chamber (1640). The writ would lie if a person was detained by order
of an illegal court, by the king, or warrant of the council or privy council. See generally,
Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts, 40 CALIF. L. Rv.325 (1952).
9. ". . . [AInd the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." PA. CoNsT. art. 1,
§ 14.
10. Halderman's Petition, 276 Pa. 1, 119 Ati. 735 (1923), discussed in Sedler, Habeas
Corpus in Pennsylvania, 20 U. Prrr. L. REv. 652, 653 (1959).
11. Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41, 24 A.2d 1 (1942); Respublica
v. Arnold, 3 Yeats 263 (1801).
12 .... Today habeas corpus has become a remedy most frequently employed after
conviction. In the Ninteenth Century, however, most petitions involving criminal
commitments preceded conviction ...
. . . [Tihe original role of merely bringing the prisoner before the court for the
purpose of furthering its business has been supplanted by a new function-reviewing the proceedings of the committing court with a view to possible invalidation
of its judgment.
Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 243, 245, 258 (1965).
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in this state is the Dermendzin case.'" The court in that case held that,
though technically premature, improper or excessive sentences have been
corrected even though the present confinement is within the term of a
legal sentence.
Moreover, in the federal courts more had been said about state habeas
corpus procedures which indicated both that the rules set forth in the
McNally case had been relaxed and that more effective habeas corpus
procedures were needed in the states. 4 One of these federal cases on
which this court relied was Martin v. Virginia. 5 The court there held that,
at least in the federal system, the concept of restraint has been relaxed.
Consequently, one on parole is still in custody, and custody is equated with
restraint of liberty. "[Habeas corpus] is not now and never has been a
static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown.... 6 Thus the
historical basis had been laid for the modification of the prematurity concept in the instant case.
The second broad basis for the holding is related to, and interacts with,
the historical development of the writ of habeas corpus. This basis, as
Justice Roberts indicates, is the tremendous increase in the number of
habeas corpus petitions occasioned by the recent United States Supreme
Court decisions on the rights of the accused. The instant case is a good
example." At issue in the present case is an allegation of denial of right
to counsel on appeal. This right was given to the criminal defendant in
the state courts in Douglas v. California." The holding in Douglas is
retroactive.19 It is important to note that the basis for the Douglas decision
is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, for the implications of the instant case when analyzed in light of this fact are far
reaching. As indicated above, one function of the writ of habeas corpus
has been to attack convictions which allegedly are violative of due
process."

Many of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions

which have applied the provisions of the first ten amendments to the
states have done so by means of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 2 ' The implication of the holding in the instant case in view
13. Commonwealth ex rel. Dermendzin v. Myers, 397 Pa. 607, 156 A.2d 804 (1959).
See Commonwealth ex rel. Cooper v. Banmiller, 193 Pa. Super. 524, 165 A.2d 397 (1960).
14. The leading prematurity case, McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934) also involved
consecutive sentences, one of which was attacked by means of a petition for habeas corpus
before the admittedly valid sentence had run. The holding of that case, as Justice Roberts
points out in the instant case, applies to the scope of the writ only in the federal courts.
15. 349 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965).
16. Id. at 784, quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
17. Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, supra note 4, at 13 n.3.
18. Supra note 2.
19. Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584 (1964).
20. Sedler, supra note 10, at 657.
21. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 6. This case is a typical example of the
"selective incorporation" approach. Gideon held that the right to counsel, because it is funda-
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of these facts is that, in addition to the extension of habeas corpus to
formerly premature due process allegations, the writ may also be used
where a denial of due process retroactively applied is alleged and, furthermore, where a denial of equal protection is retroactively asserted. This
change could be a major one, or, as the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice Bell indicates, could or should be limited.
Chief Justice Bell argues that radical changes in constitutional law
have swamped the state courts and, retroactively applied, "seriously endanger the safety and welfare of all law abiding citizens." 22 Relief, he
argues, is warranted in this case only because the circumstances are exceptional. Thus, Chief Justice Bell advocates limitations on the abrogation of the prematurity concept. There is a possibility that his opinion
may be implicitly contained within the majority opinion and subsequently
adopted by them. The reason for this conclusion is that a due process or
equal protection argument by its very nature must be decided by a tribunal on the basis of the facts in the case before it. Due process and equal
protection in this respect involve an ad hoc determination in each case.
This is precisely what the majority did in the instant case, and, perhaps,
what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will do in the future. Where exceptional factual circumstances warrant it, prematurity may be overlooked,
and the case will proceed to be reheard on the merits.
The third broad basis on which the court relies in the instant case is
not as closely related as are the historical development and constitutional
law bases. The majority holds that the prejudice which results from delay
is the immediate reason for the modification of the prematurity concept.
Justice Cohen replies in his dissent that staleness of evidence is not a
valid reason for striking down the prematurity concept, and that staleness
of evidence was as much of a problem in the McNally2 3 and A she 4 cases.
Justice Cohen then invokes the principle that courts should never decide
constitutional issues "unless and until they have to."2 5
This dissent raises a cogent point which must be answered. At the
outset it must be noted that the so-called doctrine of abstention in constitutional law in the abstract embraces a broad range of possible applications. It cannot, however, be applied with so broad a brush when
dealing with specific situations, because other factors may call for a
decision at once. In the present case such factors exist. The length of time
which usually intervenes if the prematurity concept is rigidly applied will
in the majority of cases result in the disappearance of the evidence on both
mental, is made obligatory upon the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
22. Commonwealth ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, supra note 4, at 25.
23. McNally v. Hill, supra note 14.
24. Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Ashe, 335 Pa. 575, 7 A.2d 296 (1939).
25. Commonwealth ex rel.
Stevens v. Myers, supra note 4, at 27.

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:472

sides. Thus, the prosecution, upon whom the burden of proof rests, will
not be able to sustain that burden, and some prisoners who should remain
incarcerated will be freed.
On the other hand, the convict innocent of a succeeding conviction
would be in the unenviable position of helpless inaction while watching
witnesses and other evidence which might free him pass out of his grasp.
Perhaps this is one of the reasons for the seriousness of the crimes in
which habeas corpus has been granted, and the almost total absence of
lesser offenses from habeas corpus reports.2" Justice Cohen feels that the
majority decision merely shifts the burden to already overloaded prosecutors. This, however, is a small price to pay for a determination which
will have to be made anyway, and which, if made presently, will protect
the interests of both the state and the individual.
A consideration of the basis of the decision leads to the conclusion that
the holding of the court is a wise one. Historically, conditions have
changed radically, so that the common law writ of habeas corpus must
fulfill a different, expanded function from that which it served at earlier
common law. The impact of the recent constitutional decisions was the
final drastic change which urgently called out for some procedural vehicle
by which a convict could assert alleged violations of his rights. And the
prejudice which results from disappearance of evidence under the prematurity concept is a pressing consideration. In short, the decision of the
court is the necessary and logical outgrowth of historical development and
the present relationship which exists between the state and the federal
courts.
John L. Gedid

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-Pennsylvania statute that authorizes a
jury to impose costs on an acquitted misdemeanor defendant and subjects
him to imprisonment for failure to pay such costs is invalid under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania, 86 Sup. Ct. 518 (1966).
In the recent case of Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,1 the United States Supreme
Court outlawed the "Scotch verdict" practice in Pennsylvania criminal
proceedings. This practice permitted a jury to impose the costs of prosecution on a defendant found not guilty of the substantive charge against him.
26. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 461, 484 (1960). Prof. Reitz feels

that this is very probably the reason. In his study of thirty-five federal cases in which
habeas corpus was granted, the median sentence was twenty-five years.
1. 86 Sup. Ct. 518 (1966).

